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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
V-1 OIL COMPANY, 
a corporation 
vs. 
Petitioner, 
ANCHOR PETROLEUM 
COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 8878 
REPLY B'RIEF OF PETITIONER ON 
INTERMEDIATE APPEAL 
THE ISSUE HERE GOES SOLELY TO THE LAW; 
THE FACTS ARE NOT AT ISSUE. 
The issue your petitioner brings to this Court 
is whether the parties are, under the law of con-
tract, bound by the terms of their written agree-
ment or may the respondent modify the terms there-
of by: 
I. A letter of transmittal accompanying the 
return of the executed contract of even date. 
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II. Conversation and telephonic communica-
tions had prior to the execution by respondent of 
the writing. 
III. Parol evidence as to matters outside the 
writing. 
IV. A denial that the writing expresses the 
agreement made all in the absence of an allegation 
of fraud or mistake; and 
V. Disaffirmance of his signed agreement to 
take advantage of his own default through use of 
the above evidentiary matter which your petitioner 
claims inadmissible. 
These are issues of law which your peti-
tioner relied upon in the Court below for summary 
judgment; once disposed of as a matter of law 
there remains no issue of fact to be decided. 
Respondent's brief merely reiterates his argu-
ment to the Court below that his proffered exhibits 
and parol evidence constituted facts to be determined 
by a trier of the facts. That was not the question 
there nor is it the question here. The question is, 
is such evidence admissible under the law of con-
tracts? 
In this reply brief we n1ay probably be most 
helpful to the Court by examining and briefly com-
menting upon the authorities upon which respon-
dent relies. 
Respondent argues: 
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POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S LE'TTER OF TRANSMITTAL 
WAS A COUN'TER OFFER WHICH WAS AC-
CEPTED BY 'THE DEFENDAN'T. 
The question is not vvhat does the letter say, 
but is the letter admissible in evidence? Respon-
dent's cited authorities do not go to the issue, they 
are: 
American Lumber and Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic 
Mill and Lumber Co., 290 Fed. 632, 635 
In this case the defendant [purchaser] directed 
the plaintiff to cancel all unfinished orders; on the 
plaintiff's [seller's] refusal to do so, the defendant 
[purchaser] declined to accept and pay for further 
shipments. Defense was hased upon the contention 
that the plaintiff's acc~ptances of the defendant's 
, 
orders vvere conditional and were for that reason 
counter orders and as such were rejections of the 
original orders, leaving the minds of the parties 
wholly apart. It was found from the evidence in this 
case that there was a "conditional acceptance" be-
cause of the offeror's assent to new terms imposed 
by the offeree in his acceptance - connected with 
plaintiff's [seller's] "acceptance" there were new 
matters not touched upon in the defendant's [pur-
chaser's] order. The new matters were specific and 
material and in writing, which placed the purchaser 
upon notice that the order was "accepted" subject 
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to such conditions. The Court merely held that in 
such case the "offeror's assent to new terms imposed 
by the offeree in his acceptance may be inferred 
from the fact that the parties thereafter proceeded 
'to conduct 'business under the conditional accep-
tance." Under such facts the result of the decision 
was that the "purchaser" having adhered to the 
"seUer's" conditional acceptance was bound to per-
form. 
Comment: In the case at bar, the "seller" re-
scinds because of the "purchaser" defaulting in 
perform·ance; the petitioner [seller] here by his· 
acceptance of the contract did no't impose conditions 
of acceptance upon the original contract and the 
respondent [purchaser] cannot demand continued 
performance by reason of his own default. 
Everett v. Emmons Coal Mining Co., 289 Fed. 
686. 
Comment: This is again a case where the 
seller accepted a written order by a written accep-
tance containing conditions, i.e. : 
If the conditions upon which we accept 
your order, as shown on the back hereof, are 
not satisfactory, please advise us at once, and 
we will cancel order; otherwise shipment will 
he made subject to these conditions. 
And, 'the buyer admitted receipt of such ac-
ceptance before shipments were made, and without 
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dbjection thereafter received shipments. The Court 
held that the order and acceptance, with the con-
ditions conta'ined therein, constituted the contract 
of sale. 
Boston Lumber Co. v. Pendleton Bros., 129 A. 
782. This case adheres to the ru1e expressed in the 
American Lumber and Manufacturing case, supra, 
and gives no solace to respondent here because it is 
again a suit for breach of contract to purchase. 
Cornment: For the purpose of the controversy 
hete, it can be said that this case holds only that: 
vVhere a buyer, in confirming a telephonic accep-
tance of a seller's offer, asked that certain changes 
be made to the order and seller replied and enclosed 
sales slip stating the terms of the bargain, and the 
buyc, thereafter gave shipping instructions, that 
the sales slip was binding as against a contention 
that the contract was previously complete. 
Vaughan's Seed Store, Inc. v. Morris April & 
Bros., 7 A. 2d 868. In this case the Court wrote, 
in part: 
The complaint is in two counts. The first 
sets up a debt due from the defendant on a 
book account; the second count demanded the 
sum claimed on the book account, for goods 
sold and delivered "under an agreement be-
tween the parties that a reasonable price" 
for the goods purchased -- a shipment of 
onions - would be paid 'by the defendant. 
The defense was that the goods were not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
up to the warranty under which they were 
sold in that they were not marketable, were 
"defective in quality" and "were not stan-
dard.'' 
At the close of the case the court said 
that there was in fact an agreement between 
the parties and that the defendant's order 
was subject to certain conditions imposed by 
the plaintiff which the defendant accepted 
and that those conditions expressly excluded 
warranty of any kind and, further, that ob-
jection to the goods on the buyer's part would 
not be entertained unless made within five 
days of receipt of the goods; that the defen-
dant admitted that no complaint of any kind 
was made until after the five day period had 
passed, whereupon the court directed the jury 
to find in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant for the amount of the bill. * * * 
The defendant, in its opening to the jury, 
frankly admitted that it was indebted to the 
plaintiff for some amount but that it objected 
to paying the whole clahn because the goods 
were of inferior quality. But, in our view, 
the written acceptance of the defendant's or-
der by the plaintiff and the conditions em-
bodied therein are binding on the defendant. 
The acceptance was sent the defendant by 
the plaintiff on Nov. 28, 1936. The goods 
were shipped F.O.B. Chicago early in Feb-
ruary and arrived here on Feb. 9, 1937. No 
complaint was made by the buyer until Feb. 
15, which was the sixth day after the goods 
arrived. * * * 
The Appellate Court sustained the lower court 
in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
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Comment: Another case in which the pur-
chaser "\Vas held to be bound by a provision in the 
acceptance. 
All of these authorities present fact situations 
converse to the case brought to this Court by your 
petitioner. 
135 ALR 822. On page 5 of respondent's brief, 
the following declaration appears: 
An expressed as3ent to new terms and 
conditions attached to the acceptance of an 
offer is not necessary in order to make such 
terms and conditions a part of the contract. 
Any conduct on the part of the original of-
ferer showing his assent to the modification 
of any terms and conditions of the contract 
is sufficient to make such modification a part 
of the contract. 135 ALR 822. 
This annotation upon which respondent relies 
goes on to state : 
It has been held that mere silence on the 
part of the offerer will not constitute an 
acceptance by him of added or altered con-
ditions or terms attached to the offeree's ac-
ceptance of the original offer, in the absence 
of an agreement that silence shall have such 
effect, where there is no duty on the part of 
the original offerer to reject such conditions 
or terms. 
Comment: In the case at 'bar it is admitted 
that there was no reply to respondent's letter of 
September 6, 1954 - the contended for "counter 
offer". Silence alone will not constitute an accep-
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tance of added or altered terms attached to the 
offeree's acceptance of the original offer, there be-
ing no duty on the part of your petitioner, the orig-
inal offerer, to reject such conditions or terms. 
Respondent's Point II: 
ASSUMING TH~T THE DEFENDANT'S IN-
TERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT IS COR-
RECT, PLAINTIFF, NEVERTI1ELESS, WAS 
NOT IN DEFAULT AS THE DEFENDANT HAD 
WAIVED THE PROVISIONS AS TO MINIMUM 
MON'THLY REQUIREMENTS. 
Yours Truly Biscuit Co. v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 
253 P. 817: 
The plaintiff corporation placed its or-
der with the defendant corporation on Janu-
ary 28, 1924, for 2,000 barrels of flour, at a 
specified price, to be delivered "as wanted by 
April1, 1924." 
The order was accepted, and thereafter 
prior to April 1 delivery was taken under the 
contract of 240 barrels. After the expiration 
of the time provided for in the contract, the 
plaintiff continued to order, and the defen-
dant to deliver under the contract, additional 
flour up until August 25, 1924, at which time 
a total of 654 barrels had been delivered. On 
September 8, the plaintiff ordered additional 
flour under the contract, and was advised that 
the contract had been canceled for failure to 
accept delivery within the time provided in the 
contract. The plaintiff refused to recognize 
the cancellation of the contract, and made 
demand for the balance of the flour under it, 
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to wit, 1,235 barrels, vvhich was refused. * * * 
The Court held that by continuing deliveries 
after April 1st [the expiration of the tin1e provided 
in the contract] up until August 25th, the seller 
waived the provision of the contract as to time of 
delivery. 
Comment: This case is not helpful to respon-
dent here for two reasons, (a) this p~titioner did 
not sleep on his · rights, and (b) there is no issue 
here as to prolonged deliveries after the expiration 
of the time provided in the contract. 
Commerce Cas1mlty Co. v. CampjJell, 188 S.E. 
36'3. 
Comment: This case holds that an insurer by 
accepting monthly premiums three weeks after their 
due date for more than 30 consecutive months ef-
fected a waiver of the provision of the policy relat-
ing 'to the payment of premiums; that a provision 
against waiver in the policy of insurance could it-
self be waived. 
Jordan v. Madsen, 252 P. 570, 69 U. 11'2. Case 
stands for the proposition : 
* * * that where a party to a contract, 
when the other is not in default, manifests 
in unequivocal language his intention not to 
perform the contr~act unless it is modified he 
thereby breaches the contract and becomes 
liable therefor; * * * 
Comment: In this case the party not in de-
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fault complained of the contracting party who had 
repudiated his obligation and refused to meet the 
condition, thus breaching his obligation before the 
time fixed for performance with the resultant im-
mediate right of action arising in the party not in 
default. This result is so firmly grounded upon 
reason and justice as to render authorities supel'-
fluous; vvhen one declares that he \vill not he tound 
by his contract the attendant result in law is db-
vious. The facts in the case at bar are not such -
the plaintiff and respondent was not "excused of 
performance" at time of notice or at any time until 
after notice that because of respondent's breach that 
petitioner elected to rescind. 
12 Am. Jur., Sec. 392,.p. 970; 17 C.J.S., p. 973, 
Sec. 4 72. Citing these authorities, respondent ar-
gues: (Brief, p. 11). 
The plaintiff was not in default, when 
notified of cancellation of the contract by de-
fendant. 'This was on "anticipatory breach", 
which gave the plaintiff an immediate right 
of action and excused it of performance on 
its part. * * * 
Petitioner has no quarrel with these authorities 
or with the proposition for which they stand, i.e.: 
Strictly an "anticipatory breach" of a 
contract is one committed before the time has 
come when there is a present duty of perfor-
mance, and it is the outcome of words or acts 
evincing an intention to refuse performance 
in the future. Where a party bound by an exe-
10 
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cutory contract repudiates his obligation be-
fore the time for performance, the promisee 
has, according to the great weight of author-
ity, an option to treat the contract as ended 
so far as further performance is concerned, 
and to n1aintain an action at once for the 
damages occasioned by such anticipatory 
breach. 
The plain fact is, admittedly, however, that 
after the first two n1on'ths and up to the seventeenth 
day of the third month, respondent had not per-
formed under the contract and was in default of the 
express terms thereof. We have no fact situation 
here where your petitioner [defendant] repudiated 
his obligation befo~e the time of perfor?rUlnce or at 
all until after respondent's default in performance 
thereof. 
12 Am. Jur., Sec. 343, Page 900. 
Con1ment: Further respondent makes the fol-
lowing statement on page 10 of his brief: 
The purchase by the defendant in Nov-
ember of 19,599 gallons was a substantia] per-
formance of the contract and, where there is 
a substantial performance, it gives no right of 
cancellation. (12 Am. Jur., Sec. 343, Page 
900). 
We respectfully draw the Court's attention to 
the fact that plaintiff and respondent received the 
cancellation notice on November 19, 1954; that 
thereafter on November 21st and November 22nd, 
two purchases were made of 6,507 gallons each. 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Therefore, 13,014 of the November total purchase 
of 19,599 gallons were made after petitioner ter-
minated the contract for non-performance of res-
pondent. The purchase in Novernber of 6,585 prior 
to notice of cancellation was by no means a substan-
tial performance. 
Respondent's Point III. 
IN ANY EVENT, THERE WAS A MODIFI-
CATION OF THE 'TERMS OF THE CONTRACT 
AS TO MINilVIUM AND MAXIlVIUM REQUIRE-
MENTS. 
For this Point III respondent cites: 
12 Am. Jur., Sec. 428, page 1006. 
Comment: In his Statement of Facts (p. 2,) 
respondent says : 
The con tract ( R. 3-5) was forwarded 
unsigned to the plaintiff for its signing, pro-
vided it met with its approval (Exhibit 2). 
Prior to plaintiff's signing it, however, plain-
tiff's manager talked with defendant by tele-
phone, explaining it could not meet the mini-
mum requirements, because of not having any 
customers and a sales organization, and he 
was advised tha:t this was of no importance 
and that it would furnish him with the ma-
terial he needed (Dep 10-11). Following this 
conversation, the plaintiff signed the contract, 
* * * 
Then, under his Point III, respondent argues 
as follows: 
12 
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Should this court determine that the con-
tract was subject to the minimum require-
ment and not modified by the letter of accep-
tance, plaintiff, nevertheless, urges that it 
was subsequently modified by the defendant's 
agreeing that the gallonage figures were of 
no significance and that it would always 
supply him with quantities needed. (Dep. 
10-11). 
Respondent thus admits that the alleged con-
versation as to quantities took place before the con-
tract was by him executed; " * * * Following this 
conversation, the plaintiff [respondent] signed the 
contract * * * ." It is also said in 12 Am. Jur., Sec. 
428, p. 1006 - relied upon by respondent - that: 
* * * The very purpose of the writing is 
to render the agreement more certain and to 
exclude parol evidence of it. * * * 
Respondent's Point IV. 
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEN'T 
MAY NOT BE GRAN'TED WHERE A GENUINE 
ISSUE OF FACTS EXISTS AND DOUBT MUST 
BE RESOLVED AGAINST THE M 0 VI N G 
PARTY. 
Taylor v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, 189 F. 2d 
213. Summary judgment was set aside in this case 
upon a finding by the Court of Appea1s that a real 
issue existed as to whether there had actually been 
an antecedent acceptance of challenged orders [for 
steel merchandise] upon which plaintiff [salesman] 
based his claim for commissions. 
13 
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Chappel v. Goltsman, 186 F. 2d 215. 
Comment: The issue here again goes to the 
propriety of a summary judgment; considering the 
facts there, that Court wrote : 
* * * I't seems clear to us that the basis 
of the court's opinion was not that there were 
no genuine fact issues, but rather that there 
were such issues which it proceeded to decide 
adversely to appellants, although the motion 
raises questions of in·tent, unfair competition 
and perfidious dealings which ought not to 
have been disposed of by summary judgment 
and without trial on the merits. * * * 
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464. This case 
holds that where credibility, including that of the 
defendant, is crucial, summary judgment becomes 
improper and a trial indispensable. 
Comment: There is no such issue here. Your 
petitioner relies for summary judgment upon the 
testimony of plaintiff [respondent] - relying upon 
the undisputed testimony of the bringer of the action 
and not upon evidence in dispute at all. 
Witlin v. Giacalme, 154 F. 2d 20. 
Comment: This case adheres to the rule stated 
by Professor Moore in his work on Federal Practice 
Under the New Federal Rules which is in substance 
that motion for summary judgment will be denied 
if the opposing papers show a genuine issue of fact. 
Such a rule does not meet the issue here in the 
absence of evidence which would be admissible. 
14 
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Parmelee v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 157 F. 2d 
582; 168 ALR 1130. 
Comment: An action in which the seller at-
tempted recovery for goods sold and delivered and, 
the buyer responded with six counterclaims which 
did "* * * not present sha1n issues, but issues that 
must be tried, and if they arose out of the trans-
action or occurrence which is the subject matter 
of the plaintiff's claim they are a bar to granting 
plaintiff's motion under Rule 54, counterclaims 
have long been permitted under the various state 
statutes governing pleadings. * * *" In such case 
the court he1d that summary judgment should not 
issue. 
Hawkins v. Frick-Reid Supply Corp., 154 F. 2d 
88. Here the court said: 
It is not the function of the trial court 
upon n1otion for summary judgment to try 
the issues of fact if, as here, a factual question 
is presented. (Emphasis ours.) 
The lower court awarded summary judgment 
upon the ground that a drill pipe \vas machinery 
or machinery parts and not material within the 
meaning of the invoice clause. The Appellate Court 
examined the definitions of "material" and "ma-
chinery" and wrote: 
When we come to apply these definitions 
to the drill pipe here under consideration, we 
must walk with a question mark in each hand. 
It is referred to in the record as a "string of 
drill pipe." Certain it is tha:t when it becomes 
15 
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attached to a line of pipe in a well with a 
rotary drill it becomes machinery, but apart 
and before being attached it may be material. 
* * * 
Toebelrnan v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 
130 F. 2d 1016. Stockholder's derivative suit for 
misfeasance and accounting of funds spent. Plain-
tiffs appeal from a summary judgment dismissing 
the suit. For purposes here the case stands for the 
proposition that: 
It is now well settled that summary judg-
ment may be entered for either party if the 
pleadings, depositions, admissions on file and 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is enti tied to a judgment as a matter of 
law. Civil Procedure Rule 56. Stated con-
versely, a substantial dispute as to a material 
fact forecloses summary judgment. * * * Upon 
a motion for a summary judgment it is no 
part of the court's function to decide issues 
of fact but solely to determine whether there 
is an issue of fact to be tried. * * * (Emphasis 
added). 
CONCLUSION 
Under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Summary Judgment will always issue when there 
are no facts such as would be admissible in evidence. 
(Rule 56 (e) ) . 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
and Appellant 
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